No empty threat

Jun 18th 2009 From The Economist print edition Credit-default swaps are pitting firms against their own creditors SIX FLAGS, an American theme-park operator, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on June 13th, bringing its long ride to reduce debt obligations to an abrupt halt. The surprise was that bondholders, not the tepid credit markets, stymied the restructuring effort. Bankruptcy codes assume that creditors always attempt to keep solvent firms out of bankruptcy. Six Flags and others are finding that financial innovation has undermined that premise. Pragmatic lenders who hedged their economic exposure through credit-default swaps (CDSs), a type of insurance against default, can often make higher returns from CDS payouts than from out-of-court restructuring plans. In the case of Six Flags, fingers are pointing at a Fidelity mutual fund for turning down an offer that would have granted unsecured creditors an 85% equity stake. Mike Simonton, an analyst at Fitch, a ratings agency, calculates that uninsured bondholders will receive less than 10% of the equity now that Six Flags has filed for protection. Some investors take an even more predatory approach. By purchasing a material amount of a firm’s debt in conjunction with a disproportionately large number of CDS contracts, rapacious lenders (mostly hedge funds) can render bankruptcy more attractive than solvency. Henry Hu of the University of Texas calls this phenomenon the “empty creditor” problem. About two years ago Mr Hu began noticing odd behaviour in bankruptcy proceedings—one bemused courtroom witnessed a junior creditor argue that the valuation placed on a firm was too high. With default rates climbing, he sees such perverse incentives as a looming threat to financial stability. Already the bankruptcies of AbitibiBowater, a paper manufacturer, and General Growth Properties, a property investor, in mid-April have been blamed on bondholders with unusual economic exposures. Some also suspect that CDS contracts played a role in General Motors’ filing earlier this month. Solutions to the problem are, so far, purely theoretical. One option would be regulation requiring disclosure by investors of all credit-linked positions. There is now almost no disclosure of who owns derivatives on a company’s debt, leaving firms to guess how amenable creditors will be when approached with a restructuring plan. Longer-term solutions rest on an overhaul of the bankruptcy code and debt agreements to award votes and control based on net economic exposure, rather than the nominal amount of debt owned. Supporters of the market point to the value of CDSs in reducing the cost of capital and to plans for a central clearing house that will reduce redundancy and increase transparency. But the reform roller-coaster has not yet come to a halt.