Monday, August 16, 2010

Bonds Sneeze, but Is It Contagious?

By MICHAEL SANTOLI

THE SUMMER HEAT NOTWITHSTANDING, Wall Street is now thick with folks shivering over the collapse of Treasury-bond yields, reading it as an augur of a coming deflationary ice age.

The question, "What is the bond market telling us?" is being asked with growing urgency, mostly by folks who have settled on the answer that the bond market is conveying a message that economic- growth expectations are in peril and that the stock market—which even after last week's dip is in the upper end of its summer range—is ignoring it at grave risk.

The 10-year Treasury yield sliding to a 16-month low of 2.68% shouldn't be ignored or explained away. It's for good reason the stock market was dubbed "the bond market's idiot kid brother." Clearly, at minimum, the 10-year yield at these levels reflects the general reduction in U.S. growth assumptions, both about last quarter and the second half of the year. Yet there is probably more going on here than bonds reliably pricing in another economic contraction that would upend stocks. There's even a chance that neither stocks nor bonds have the outlook wrong. The argument between the two asset classes might instead be a subdued and agreeable discussion.

At the most basic level, both markets seem to have internalized the idea that the Federal Reserve's zero-rate policy is the law of the land for the investable future, and policy makers stand ready to throw money at the economy's problems, be they evident or hypothetical. With overnight lending rates at zero and the two-year note yield barely above half a percent in yield, the incentives for banks and other leveraged investors to simply coast along the yield curve remain strong, even at 2.68% on the 10-year.

There have also been hints that some of the buying pressure on 10-year Treasuries looks forced or mechanical, related to hedging by mortgage-bond investors. One thing is sure: The rally in longer-term Treasury paper hasn't been supported by the largest U.S. bond investor. Pacific Investment Management, which Bloomberg recently reported is taking in $1 billion a week from bond-craving investors, reduced U.S. government-related holdings in its flagship Total Return fund in July from 63% to a still-high 54%.

A more salient rejoinder to the admonition to heed the bond market is, "Which bond market, exactly?"

Because in contrast to the purported economic malaise and acute risk aversion being foretold by teensy Treasury yields, the corporate bond market hasn't flinched at all.

The iShares iBoxx Investment Grade Debt exchange-traded fund (ticker: LQD) traded at nearly a five-year high last week. The iShares iBoxx High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (HYG) has held steady in the last three months, as the 10-year Treasury yield sank more than 20%. If economic and corporate fortunes were due to erode quickly, corporate debt would presumably be sniffing this out as well.

For sure, corporate debt is supported by a couple of strong tailwinds. Very slow but positive economic growth is something near a nirvana state for credit, as strategists at Morgan Stanley noted. Companies can handily service their debt without necessarily growing rapidly, and a sluggish recovery forestalls inflationary fears that can poison returns.

And, of course, the public is bingeing on bonds, and has been for years. In the first half of 2010, investors sent $136 billion in net new money into bond mutual funds, taking the total net inflow since the start of 2009 above $500 billion.

Corporate America has been availing itself of the public's willingness to lend, as the widely noted International Business Machines (IBM) sale of three-year notes at a 1% rate attests. The percentage of new corporate-capital issuance in the form of equity is near a 20-year low. History suggests that what companies are most eager to sell isn't the best buy, and vice versa.

The risk isn't necessarily that there's a bond "bubble," as is commonly heard (especially from folks who sell stocks). A bubble requires that the public be whipped up into a state of enthusiasm over some grandiose "story" about a certain asset class. That isn't happening, unless one considers the sober demographic argument in favor of income instruments.

No, one take-away is that bond investors better be happy with the coupon, because not much absolute appreciation is likely from current levels. And most probably are.

Another is that if the environment remains OK for corporate credit, then it shouldn't be terribly hostile to equities. J.P. Morgan noted last week that the forward "earnings yield" of the Standard & Poor's 500 based on current forecasts is 8.1%, while high-yield bonds were at 8.3%—the narrowest spread in history (it has averaged 5.1% since 1987).

Telling a similar story in a different way, the dividend yield of the Dow Jones Industrial Average components, at 2.65%, is essentially equal to the 10-year Treasury yield. The folks at Morgan Stanley note that over the past 50 years the Dow's yield has exceeded that of the 10-year Treasury for only one period—the end of 2008 into early 2009, as the financial crisis climaxed.

Sunday, August 15, 2010

'Hindenburg Omen' Flashes

Technical Gauge and Its Creator Sense Stock Gloom; 'Good Conspiracy Theories'?

By STEVEN RUSSOLILLO And TOMI KILGORE
Forget about Friday the 13th. Many on Wall Street took to whispering about an even scarier phenomenon—the "Hindenburg Omen."

The Omen, named after the famous German airship in 1937 that crashed in Lakehurst, N.J., is a technical indicator that foreshadows not just a bear market but a stock-market crash. Its creator, a blind mathematician named Jim Miekka, said his indicator is now predicting a market meltdown in September.
The Omen's Criteria

All criteria must be met for a confirmed occurrence.

* The daily number of new NYSE 52-week highs and the daily number of new 52-week lows must both be greater than 2.5% of the total issues traded that day.
* The smaller of the 52-week highs and lows must be greater than or equal to 79 (or 2.5% of 3,168 issues).
* The NYSE's 10-week moving average must be rising.
* The McClellan Oscillator, a measure of market fluctuations, must be negative.
* New 52-week highs can't be more than twice the new 52-week lows. (However, it is acceptable for the new 52-week lows to be more than double the 52-week highs.)

Wall Street has been abuzz about whether the Hindenburg Omen will come to bear, with some traders cautioning clients about the indicator and blogs pondering all the doom and gloom. But Andrew Brenner, managing director at Guggenheim Securities, told his clients: "Personally, it sounds like [people] are starting their weekend drinking early."

Technical indicators, with names like "The Death Cross" and "The Bearish Abandoned Baby" have been attracting mainstream attention in recent months. Amid an increasingly volatile market, investors have been searching for any clues about stocks' direction, especially this past week where major indexes fell more than 3%.

"We always love good conspiracy theories," said Joseph Battipaglia, chief market strategist of the private-client group at Stifel Nicolaus. But he noted that market watchers sometimes make too much of what could be mere coincidences. "I for one dismiss all these things because they usually erupt most numerously during bear markets."

Mr. Miekka came up with the Omen in 1995 as a way to predict big market downturns, developing a formula that parses data like 52-week stock levels and the moving averages of the New York Stock Exchange. He said the Hindenburg Omen's name was coined by a fellow market technician, Kennedy Gammage, when they found out the name "Titanic" already had been taken.
The confluence of data used by the Omen was officially tripped this week. There were 92 companies that hit new 52-week highs on Thursday, or 2.9% of all companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange. There were also 81 new lows, or 2.6% of the total. Each number must exceed 2.5% for the Omen to occur, according to Mr. Miekka.

Other criteria include a rising 10-week moving average for NYSE and a negative McClellan Oscillator, a technical indicator that measures market fluctuations. Mr. Miekka said the appearance of one signal is usually an indication of a market top, but the Omen becomes more accurate when there are two or more close together.

The Omen was behind every market crash since 1987, but also has occurred many other times without an ensuing significant downturn. Market analysts said only about 25% of Omen appearances have led to stock-market declines that can be considered crashes.

"The Hindenburg Omen does show some deteriorating internals, which signals some major concerns," said Ryan Detrick, senior technical strategist at Schaeffer's Investment Research. "But it isn't a reason to move to 100% in cash. We're taking a wait-and-see approach, but considering its recent history, we're considering it more than other indicators."

Mr. Miekka, who writes a Wall Street newsletter called "Sudbury Bull & Bear Report" out of his homes in Maine and Florida, wasn't even aware that his own Hindenburg Omen indicator was activated. The 50-year-old former physics teacher, who is an avid target shooter, said he was "taken by surprise" after he plugged the data into his model.

He didn't say whether it is a good time to bail out of the market, but he isn't exactly in a bullish mood when it comes to stocks. "I'll be dancing close to the door," he said.
—Donna Kardos Yesalavich contributed to this article.

Write to Steven Russolillo at steven.russolillo@dowjones.com and Tomi Kilgore at tomi.kilgore@dowjones.com

Saturday, August 14, 2010

杭州晒3万套空置房 “空城计”频刺公众神经

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搜狐 2010-08-14 01:26:14



  6500万套空置房”事件正在持续发酵中。日前,杭州五城区57万户商品房中有3万户“零水表”空置房半年无用电记录又被晒出。空置率到底有多少?权威性几多?而刚需购房者更关心的似乎是,空置房数字背后相关职能部门的执行力度有多大?



近日,国家统计局网站公布消息称:截至今年6月底,全国商品房待售面积超1.9亿平方米,同比增加了6.4%。

根据杭州水业集团的一份最新内部数据统计显示:杭州五城区57万户安装水表的住宅中,有3万户为“零水表”。

  杭州几多楼盘唱“空城”



  据报道,杭州水业集团工作人员称,这3万个“零水表”主要分布在20多个小区,并且6个月度数都超过零度的有17742户。杭州双赢机构总经理章慧芳认为,这个数字比较具有信服力。



  空置率、黑灯率再次成为舆论关注焦点。杭州许多论坛都发起了“晒黑灯”“晒水表”“晒电表”等等民间空置率调查的活动。在某网站发起的调查中显示,有85.5%的人认为杭州房屋空置率高是投资者的炒房行为所导致的。另有6.5%的人觉得交通及相关配套不完善,业主没有入住也是房屋空置率高的原因之一。而只有4.3%的人认为和开发商囤房有关。



  在杭州市滨江区的欣盛•东方郡、中海•钱塘山水、钱江•水晶城 (论坛 新闻)、中兴•和园 (论坛 新闻)等小区,与其他板块小区的万家灯火不同,这些小区入夜后显得尤为黝黑寂静。记者从小区保安处了解到,此等小区常年无人居住。



  事实上,被闲置的楼盘还不仅限于杭州滨江区。位于杭州西溪板块的西溪里、留庄、大华西溪风情、和庄等别墅群,常年被闲置。附近百姓感概道:富人花费百万至千万购买的精品别墅竟成保姆住宅。豪宅频遭闲置的传言,一次又一次在现实中上演。



  空置房问题由来已久,从几年前杭州商品房空置就屡见不鲜,导致70%的物业公司长期找不到业主收物业费而亏损,频现房屋供给不足与存量过剩并存的“怪象”,再到近期全国空置房规模口水大战,空置房一度刺痛“房奴”们的神经。



  空置房数字背后的执行力度



  房地产泡沫已经成为当前不争的事实。房价暴涨、开发商囤地捂盘,投机者伺机囤房炒作,随着4月份一系列房产调控政策的出台,刚性购房者在观望数月后发现,相关房产数据并未击破7月楼市拐点之论。



  “空置房数据庞大令人堪忧,这与房地产行业暴利和炒房者炒作有很大的关系。”更多的杭州人除了关心空置房数字,更关心数字背后相关职能部门的执行力度。



  “如果不解决存量房闲置,再多的土地供应,再多的开发量也于事无补,反而会‘把经济吊死在房地产这棵树上’。”独立地产评论员、社会学博士王智中表示。



  在王智中看来,只有让炒房者无利可图,某些官员或富人屯积的房源才会“海量”推向市场。”当前房产政策调控不是非常成功,只有将炒房者和囤房者从房地产市场中清理清理,通过市场方式一视同仁,收取房屋增值税,才能达到真正的釜底抽薪,房产市场才会健康发展。



  “4月14日‘新国四条’出台,音译‘试一试,于是很多刚性购房者愿意等一等、试一试,纵观房产市场未来前景’。”王智中说。“国十条”的出台,旨在强调坚决遏制以投机、投资为目的的购房需求。然而时到今日,杭州市并没有出台“国十条”的相关实施细则,导致操作困难,房地产市场出现从未有过的暧昧。



  随着住建部、央行、银监会三部委联合发文明确的二套房认定标准颁布,各银行总行的操作细则基本落实,所以许多银行已经恢复政策之前的程序。不过杭州由于没有出台相关细则,所以准备放开三套房受理程序。



  哥德巴赫的猜想还要“猜 ”多久



  “6540万套空置房”的传言发酵数月之后,中国国家电网否认统计和发布过此类数据。杭州到底有多少空置房也尚无权威认定。



  空置率是不是“哥德巴赫猜想”,还需时间验证。据了解,国外这样调查房屋空置率———通过在一个区域或者在一个城市,比如说用水费、电费等相关的这些指标来进行调查。



  业内人士认为,空置房成因复杂,既有过去“房改房”等政策因素,使一些家庭拥有了价格便宜的多套房;又有通过单位集资建房等方式,形成了不少“一户多房”现象;还有近年来有些富人认为缺乏很好的投资对象,用闲钱投资购置了多套商品房;另外,公租房、经适房供给不足、房价长期盼涨,造成买房冲动。



  空置房数据被爆出后,有人人云亦云大骂投机商,也有知名人士站出来声讨质疑。地产界“大炮”任志强在博客中通过“专业”计算得出结论:所谓全国6500万套空置房的说法根本不靠谱。他认为,媒体报道的通过增加闲置税提高空置房出租率只会减少租赁市场房源而最终推动房租进一步提升。统计空置率应该由房管局、统计局等权威部门来做。



  上海市锦天城律师事务所律师陈建文认为,空置房的统计,是下一步调控的基础数据,是对房市泡沫程度的判断,相关税收政策制订征收的基础,通过税收等手段挤出房源扩大供给。政府相关部门有必要对空置房进行统计,在涉及房屋空置率上”,水业公司的“水表”和电力公司的“电表”统计更能反映实际情况,比任志强讲的房管局、统计局更具有权威性。



  “任志强认为增加闲置税提高空置房出租率只会减少租赁房源,便会推动房租提升,该推论可谓牵强。按照惯例闲置税增加会将一部分闲置房推入出租房市场、房屋交易市场,进而降低房价和租金,这对缓解当前房市供需矛盾均利好,能从根本上缓解房价过高和租金上涨过快的难题。” 陈建文还表示。



  房产调控也几经轮回,空置房的话题被几度关注成热。有人预言房价下降成定局不期而至,房地产市场走向健康。此次,会不会因势利导新的出台新政策,一切似乎还没有定论。

Friday, August 13, 2010

Dow Theory Lesson: Bear Markets

Like bull markets, bear markets can usually be characterized by three phases.

The first is the “distribution” phase, which usually starts in the latter stage of the bull market’s “blow-off” phase. This phase starts with the “smart” investors (institutions and insiders) recognizing that a bubble in prices exists with price-to-earnings ratios well above average historical highs. As prices go higher and higher, the smart investors scale in their sales and are out of the market when the top is reached. Volume in this phase is usually high, but in its final days the tip-off is that volume begins to decline on up days and advance on down days.

The second phase is one of “panic.” Buyers thin out and sellers become more urgent as a downward spiral in prices suddenly accelerates into an almost vertical drop, and volume reaches climactic proportions. After the second phase, it is not unusual to have a long secondary rally that slowly grinds to a low-volume phase that introduces the final sell-off.

The final phase is characterized by sellers who held on through the panic and are now resigned to the fact that prices will head even lower. Business news is now deteriorating rapidly and the penny stocks that had doubled and tripled have now lost all of their gains with many going out of business. Blue chips are still falling, although at a slower rate, but then even they are thrown out with everything else in a final crescendo of selling.

The bear market ends when everything in the way of possible bad news has been discounted and the public never wants to own stocks again.

Not all bear and bull markets are alike, and individual markets may even lack one of the phases mentioned. Also, there is no time estimate for either type of markets. However, since 1950, most bull markets have lasted for three to five years, and bear markets have been as short as three months and as long as three years.

Retail Sales - July 2010, comes back to positive


Released on 8/13/2010 8:30:00 AM For Jul, 2010

PriorConsensusConsensus RangeActual
Retail Sales - M/M change-0.5 %0.5 %0.2 % to 1.0 %0.4 %
Retail Sales less autos - M/M change-0.1 %0.2 %0.0 % to 0.7 %0.2 %
Highlights

Retail sales made a comeback in July – but it mainly was due to a jump in auto sales. Overall retail sales in July rebounded 0.4 percent, following a 0.3 percent decrease in June. Analysts had called for a 0.5 percent boost. Excluding autos, sales gained 0.2 percent, following a 0.1 percent down tick in June. The July ex-auto number equaled the median forecast. Sales excluding autos and gasoline slipped 0.1 percent, following a 0.2 percent boost in June. The underlying trend for consumer spending is soft, indicating that the recovery is slowing. Numbers are not weak enough to confirm a double dip.

On the news, markets were little changed.

Market Consensus Before Announcement

Retail sales in June shrank 0.5 percent, following a 1.1 percent decline in May. The June decline was led by a decline in motor vehicle sales with lower gasoline station sales also contributing. Sales ex autos only edged down 0.1 percent, following a 1.2 percent drop in May. Sales excluding autos and gasoline rebounded 0.1 percent, following a 1.0 contraction in May. Recent news is mixed for the strength of July sales. Unit new auto sales rebounded 3.3 percent. Chain store sales for July were mixed.
Definition
Retail sales measure the total receipts at stores that sell durable and nondurable goods. Consumer spending accounts for two-thirds of GDP and is therefore a key element in economic growth.  Why Investors Care
 
[Chart] Nearly 75 percent of the time, changes in monthly retail sales are between +1 percent and -1 percent. However, there are many months in which the monthly change falls outside that range. Most of the time, excessive increases or decreases are due to higher/lower spending on motor vehicle sales. Year-over-year changes in retail sales can be volatile as well, but tend to be smoother than monthly changes.
Data Source: Haver Analytics

Irish Banks Rattling Nerves

Irish Banks Rattling Nerves

Renewed Troubles Hint That Recent 'Stress Tests' Didn't Accomplish Their Goal

By SARA SCHAEFER MUñOZ And DAVID ENRICH
LONDON—Less than a month after stress tests calmed concerns about the health of European banks, new problems in the Irish banking sector are making investors nervous once again.
Earlier this week, Ireland received European Commission approval for an additional €10 billion ($13 billion) in capital for state-owned Anglo Irish Bank, on top of the €14.3 billion the government has already injected into the bank. On Wednesday, Bank of Ireland, 36%-owned by the government, reported a pretax first-half loss nearly twice as big as its loss a year earlier.
 
The combination of events has made it more expensive for Ireland to borrow and driven the country's credit-default insurance costs 36% higher since the start of the month, to levels last seen just ahead of the European banking stress tests.


The renewed troubles in Ireland offer the latest hints that the recent stress tests of 91 big European banks haven't accomplished their central goal: easing concerns about the health of the continent's financial institutions and, by extension, reducing fears about deeply indebted sovereigns, such as Ireland.
 
EU regulators announced the test results on July 23, showing that just seven of the 91 tested banks would need more capital in a worst-case scenario. The upbeat results seemed to cheer the markets, with bank stocks rallying and the cost of insuring their bonds against default declining.
But problems have started to crop up again. Bank stocks have tumbled, with the Stoxx Europe 600 banking index down about 8% in the last two weeks. Bank funding costs have climbed, a sign of wariness among banks and investors about the sector's conditions.

Lenders in southern Europe have increased their reliance on the European Central Bank as a source of funds, according to data released Thursday by central banks. Greek banks boosted their borrowings in July by about 2.5% from June, Portuguese banks' ECB borrowings jumped by about 21% and Italian banks borrowed an additional 12%.

"The evidence this week seems to indicate that the stress tests might have failed to ring-fence the periphery" of Europe, Royal Bank of Scotland's Andy Chaytor and Nick Matthews wrote in a research note Thursday.

For right now, Ireland's problems have moved to center stage. On Thursday, the government sold €1 billion in six- and eight-month treasury bills, paying 2.458% on the six-month note, a big jump from the 1.367% yield it paid at the last auction three weeks ago. The yield on the 10-year bond rose to 5.367%, 2.94 percentage points higher than the relative German bund and up almost half a percentage point from one week ago.

Philip Lane, a professor of international and macro-economics at Trinity College in Dublin, said Anglo Irish's call for more capital is troublesome and there are worries that the deeper the government digs into its loan book, the more problems it could find.

Still, he said, "Financial markets can go into panic mode, and it's hard to say that the Irish fundamentals are sufficiently bad to warrant these spreads."

Problems in the Irish banking sector stem from Ireland's collapsed commercial-real-estate sector, where the market for office developments and build-able land has become illiquid. Anglo Irish was particularly exposed to these toxic commercial-real-estate assets.

In May, the bank sold about €10 billion of such loans to the National Asset Management Agency, or NAMA, at a discount of nearly 55%. But Anglo might be facing an even tougher haircut on its coming asset sales. NAMA said last month that it applied an average 48% discount to assets it received from four other Irish lenders, which analysts generally view as having healthier balance sheets than Anglo. Loans from one of those institutions—Irish Nationwide Building Society—faced a severe 72% haircut.

The fact that Anglo's loans weren't included in the mid-July transfer to NAMA has fueled speculation that Anglo will be forced to accept a higher discount than it did in its previous transfer, which would further erode the bank's capital buffer. A NAMA spokesperson couldn't be reached Thursday.
[IREBANKS]
—Margot Patrick contributed to this article. Write to David Enrich at david.enrich@wsj.com

Deciphering Today’s Violent Market Moves

Mohamed El-Erian
CEO and co-CIO

Why such a sharp sell-off in equities on Wednesday, together with a further rally in U.S. government bonds? I suspect that three U.S.-related drivers are part of the answer – one is obvious, and two, less so.

Tuesday’s FOMC statement confirmed what the high frequency partial data have been signaling for a few weeks now: the U.S. economic recovery has lost momentum. And Wednesday’s export numbers amplified the message given by recent employment, housing and retail sale reports.

Analysts are now downgrading their projections for Q3 (and 2010) growth, again and rightly so. Goldman and a couple of other banks did so a few days ago; others are following. This translates into lower top revenue growth for companies, and less rosy earning expectations. Of course, equity prices do not like this. Cisco’s numbers tonight will not help.

I would suggest that there are two other, less obvious factors:

As Rich Clarida and I recently argued in the FT, sharp risk-on/risk-off swings in markets are to be expected given the reality of today’s macro context.

A couple of weeks ago, Fed chairman Ben Bernanke called the outlook “unusually uncertain“. We went further, arguing that expectations of outcomes have evolved in an interesting manner – from the more familiar bell curve (a dominant mean and thin tails) to a much flatter distribution with fatter tails. In such an expectation world, short-term news can have a disproportionate impact on market valuations.

Perceptions of fatter tails – just witness the increasing talk of a double dip and deflation – also speak to the third factor behind Wednesday’s violent market moves: when you are potentially on the road to deflation, a small change in probability will have an amplified impact on markets.

Deflation traps are nasty. Once you are in one, it is really hard to get out. Policy effectiveness erodes very quickly; and the nasty politics of deflation further complicates the kind of effort required to get out of the traps. Just witness Japan.

So while deflation may still be the risk (rather than baseline) scenario for the U.S., a rise in its probability can cause quite an impact on markets.

Most likely, markets will remain nervous and volatile in the weeks ahead. We should expect further downward revisions in analysts’ growth, revenue and earning projections. It will take time for markets to adjust to the reality of a flatter expectation distribution and fatter tail. And the probability of deflation (which I have put at 25 per cent) will have an impact even though it’s not dominant.

And if you are still wondering on this last issue, ask yourself the following question: would you accept a lift from a person who has a one-in-four chance of getting into a really bad car accident?